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ABSTRACT
The article presents a theory of the basis and nature of parents’ rights that 
appeals to the goods distinctively produced by intimate-but-authoritative relation-
ships between adults and the children they parent. It explores the implications of 
that theory for questions about parents’ rights to raise their children as members of a 
religion, with particular attention to the issue of religious schooling. Even if not ob-
structing the development of their children’s capacity for autonomy, parents exceed 
the bounds of their legitimate authority in so far as they aim deliberately to influence 
their children’s religious views. Healthy familial relationships involve some identifi-
cation of child with parent and require a sphere of spontaneous interaction between 
parent and child that are in any case likely to influence those views and constitute a 
standing threat to autonomy. Correcting over-deferential understandings of parents’ 
rights enables schools better to promote not only children’s autonomy but also other 
legitimate civic goals.
When they are born, children have no religious views and they cannot identify as 
members of a religion. They become adherents of a religion—they come to engage in 
certain practices or endorse certain beliefs—just as they become atheists or agnostics: 
through a process of socialization and upbringing and education. Religious freedom 
is hugely important; people must be at liberty to act on their religious beliefs (or lack 
of them). But that leaves a question about parents’ rights to raise other people—their 
children—in ways that reflect their own beliefs.
Liberal political philosophy struggles with that question. Its core thought is 
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that individuals should exercise their own judgment about how they are to live. One 
of the things that many choose to do with their lives, and one that many regard as 
among their most important life projects, is to raise children—and to exercise their 
own judgment about how to raise them. But parental rights are rights over others, 
others who have no realistic exit option and whose interest in making their own 
judgments about how they are to live their lives is no less important than that of the 
adults raising them.
It is difficult to know how to strike the right balance between the interests of 
parents and children, but that task is all the more challenging because children’s 
healthy development itself depends on their experiencing a very special kind of rela-
tionship with their parents. I will argue that, to become autonomous individuals, chil-
dren need to grow up identifying with, and developing strong attachments towards, 
those who exercise authority over them. If that is right, then the kind of parent-child 
relationship that serves children’s interest in developing autonomy can itself pose 
a threat to that interest. Any plausible theory of parents’ rights must attend to the 
complex ways in which the agency of parents and children, and their wellbeing, are 
bound together.
Most political discussion of parents’ rights with respect to their children’s reli-
gious upbringing tends to focus on questions about schooling. It is taken for granted 
that parents must be free to raise their children as members of a religion at home. 
Indeed, that freedom is usually held to extend to homeschooling and to parents’ 
use of private schools. Only when public resources are involved—only in state or 
public schools—do questions about the regulation of religious schooling, and about 
the extent to which the state should cater to parents’ religious views, typically 
arise. Different countries take very different positions on that, all the way from the 
American insistence that public schools be religion-free zones to the Dutch view that 
any sufficiently large group of co-religionists is entitled to public funds to set up a 
school consonant with their religious beliefs.
My argument will indeed deliver conclusions about religious schooling—both 
where the state is involved and where it is not—but it will do so by digging deeper, 
querying background assumptions that unduly constrain our thinking and them-
selves require critical attention. Properly to address issues about the regulation of 
religious schools we must consider the general question of when the state may step 
in to limit parents’ authority over their children’s religious upbringing.
I start from a basic commitment to liberal equality. The “liberal” element means 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 ADAM SWIFT32
that it is important that people are free to form, critically reflect on, and act in accor-
dance with their own judgments about how to live. (Cf. Rawls’ (1971) identification 
of a highest-order interest in our capacity to “frame, revise and pursue a conception 
of the good”.) They should be authors of their own lives, allowed and encouraged to 
develop the capacity for autonomy, without coercion or undue interference by others; 
it is part of the state’s function to protect and nurture that capacity. The “equality” 
element means that each person counts equally—nobody’s freedom is more impor-
tant than anybody else’s and, from the state’s point of view, each person’s living the 
life of her choice matters equally.
This vision, originally developed to liberate citizens from an overbearing 
state founded on hierarchy, has been extended to the sphere formerly regarded as 
“private” with transformative implications for relations between men and women, 
but it has not yet had the same impact on relations between parents and children. 
Many children today are a bit like women were in the not-so-distant past, victims of 
an ideology that failed to recognize their claims to liberty and equality. We continue 
to grant parents extensive rights to control their children—including the right delib-
erately to inculcate the parents’ own views in ways that inhibit the development of 
children’s capacity to exercise or act on their own judgment about how they are to 
live their lives when they reach adulthood. And we fail to treat children as equal in 
importance with their parents: although we intervene to prevent abuse or neglect, we 
routinely allow children to be subordinated to their parents’ projects, to be treated as 
vehicles through which parents may seek to realize their own ideas about how to live. 
Advocates of school choice, for example, typically invoke the importance of parents’ 
getting to choose their children’s schools as if what mattered was the satisfaction of 
parents’ preferences rather than the interests of those subject to their choices.
Tackling questions about religious schooling forces us back to philosophical 
basics. To decide whether parents have the right to send their children to a religious 
school, or to one that teaches that all religion is a delusion, we need to know what 
rights they have with respect to their children’s upbringing in general. We need to 
think about why parents should get to exercise any authority in that—and indeed in 
any other—domain. Nobody thinks that it would be permissible for me to raise your 
child in my religion. Why should I get to do that to mine? Should I get to do that to 
mine? (Clayton 2006 and forthcoming).
My answer will appeal to the goods—“familial relationship goods”—that can be 
realized in parent-child relationships (Brighouse and Swift 2014). These are not goods 
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like cars or washing machines; they are goods simply in being good for people—
aspects of people’s lives that make those lives go well rather than badly. Only by un-
derstanding why it’s valuable that children should have parents at all can we think 
seriously about what rights parents should have to do things to, with and for their 
children. Only then can we assess claims about the extent of their right to influence 
their children’s emerging values, and only with that assessment in place can we work 
through the implications for religious schooling.
To develop the very capacities that liberals value, children need an intimate-
but-authoritative relationship with particular adults. So those committed to liberal 
equality do not deny that parents should have the right to exercise considerable 
control over their children’s lives. Some discretionary authority—unmonitored by 
others, and to some extent unmonitored even by themselves—is essential if parents 
are to play their role in their children’s healthy development. As standardly framed, 
the philosophical challenge is to identify the proper limits on parents’ authority over 
their children; to strike the right balance between respecting parents’ freedom to 
live their lives according to their own beliefs, which for many include beliefs about 
how their children should be raised, and children’s interest in developing the capac-
ity for autonomy. Focusing on familial relationship goods, and on the quality of the 
parent-child relationship, offers a distinctive way of approaching that challenge. In 
order to develop autonomy, and for many other reasons, children themselves need a 
close emotional bond which permits, and indeed requires, parents to be spontaneous 
and open in their relationships with their children. Making that kind of relation-
ship central opens the door to more specific and difficult questions. How much, or 
what kinds of, authority must parents have for the relationship to work its magic? To 
what extent does the valuable intimacy between parent and child depend on parents’ 
being free to share themselves—including their religious views—with their children? 
How, if at all, might the kind of parent-child relationship that is in children’s interests 
depend on parents being free to influence the content of their children’s schooling?
The view to be presented invokes claims with which many religious parents 
will disagree, as will some atheists. Those who regard their children’s following the 
true path as more important than those children’s capacity to judge for themselves 
whether the path in question is indeed true will reject the autonomy condition. So 
will those who care more that their children see the falsity of all religious doctrines 
than that they come to see it for themselves. Both will deny my more specific claim 
that one of the duties that parents owe their children is overseeing the development 
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of their capacity to decide for themselves how they want to live their lives. Building 
the facilitation of children’s autonomy into the parental role is, I believe, the right 
approach, and another way in which the familial relationship goods approach recon-
ceives the more conventional opposition between parents’ and children’s interests. 
But it ups the stakes in the disagreement with the parent who simply denies that au-
tonomy matters: on the view to be presented here, that parent has not only failed to 
recognize what she in fact owes her children, she has not understood what it is that 
grounds her claim to be a parent in the first place.
Of course, a parent’s freedom to raise her child as a member of a religion, and 
a child’s interest in developing the capacity for autonomy, are just two of many con-
siderations relevant to the assessment of policy on religious schooling. In other, 
collaborative and interdisciplinary, work (Brighouse et al 2018), my colleagues and 
I have attempted to provide a framework for thinking about educational decisions 
quite generally. That framework emphasizes both the variety of different “education-
al goods” that schools should seek to produce and the range of other “independent 
values” that must be taken into account when forming judgments about policy all 
things considered. With regard to the former, the capacity for autonomy sits along-
side the capacities for economic productivity, for democratic competence, for healthy 
personal relationships, for treating others as equals, and for personal fulfilment; these 
are all desirable educational outputs the production of which can pull decisions in 
different directions. It matters both what mix of those we should be aiming to achieve 
for any given individual and how they should be distributed among the population. 
As for the latter, parents’ interests rank with childhood goods, respect for demo-
cratic processes, and freedom of residence and occupation, as considerations that 
must be weighed in the balance when deciding how schools, and indeed other insti-
tutions with educational significance (such as the mass media), should be regulated. 
Given this multiplicity of relevant factors, one might wonder whether parents’ rights 
warrant the extensive attention they will receive here.
To see why they do, we need to distinguish between parents’ interests and 
parents’ rights. While this more general framework presents parents’ interests as just 
one consideration to be weighed in the consequentialist balance alongside others, 
claims about parents’ rights typically assert something stronger. The thought is pre-
cisely that, properly identified, parents’ rights—including their right to raise their 
children as members of a religion—have a normative status such that they should be 
respected even where doing so may be inimical to the optimal production and/or dis-
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tribution of educational and other goods. They are non-consequentialist consider-
ations that morally constrain the pursuit of good outcomes. If parents really do have 
the moral right to send their children to a religious school, then that is something 
that states must respect. Not to do so would be to treat those parents unjustly.
Correcting mistaken views about parents’ rights is a crucial part of the overall 
picture because excessive deference to parents drastically constrains efforts to 
achieve a better balance of educational goods, and to distribute those goods more 
fairly. Misjudging the proper extent of parents’ rights to control their children’s 
schooling affects all children, not only those having the control exercised over them. 
And it has the potential to deprive children of more than the capacity of autonomy. 
That is partly because many of the outcomes we rely on schools to achieve depend—
in part—on the kinds of children who go to them (Clayton et al 2019). If parents are 
allowed to opt for segregated schools, then all children, not just their own, miss out 
on the educational benefits of mixed school composition. This applies most obvi-
ously to the other-regarding or “civic” goals of education, such as the capacity to treat 
others as moral equals. If parents have the right to protect their children from knowl-
edge of other religions, or to deny them the kind of school environment that is most 
likely to foster tolerant attitudes, then we may all be condemned to share a society, 
and a democracy, with intolerant others who know little about their fellow citizens. 
(For the role that schools can play in promoting intergroup contact, see Wölfer et al 
2018.) And since spending time with others from different home cultures promotes 
critical reflection on one’s own, and provides a sense of the different ways of living 
one’s life, mixed schools are also conducive to autonomy. If members of a religious 
faith school their children in particular ways that exclude, or are simply not attractive 
to, others, all children are deprived of the educational benefits they would get from 
being schooled alongside such children.
Correctly identifying the scope and content of parents’ rights with respect to 
children’s religious schooling is important, then, not only for the sake of their chil-
dren’s autonomy—though that would be reason enough—but because it affects the 
education of other people’s children, and indeed the whole character of the society. 
By offering an alternative understanding of the nature and basis of parents’ rights, 
my aim is primarily to discredit the prevalent view, thereby removing—at least at the 
level of theory—an obstacle to education policies that can achieve better, and fairer, 
outcomes for all our children.
Our society currently gets parents’ rights not just marginally but massively 
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wrong. We have, of course, moved well beyond the classical Roman view that a child 
was the father’s property and could be killed at his behest, but much of our thinking 
remains “proprietarian”. We accord parents rights over their children as if children 
are quasi-property—as if they belong to their parents in some sense. In many coun-
tries, parents who wish to raise their children in ways inimical to their developing the 
capacity for autonomy are free to “school” them at home, thereby avoiding almost 
all regulation, or to send them to private schools which, though regulated to some 
extent, can in practice reinforce the home culture so thoroughly that it becomes very 
hard for children to gain critical distance. But that is only the far end of the spec-
trum. Many readers who share the liberal commitment to autonomy and object to 
that kind of upbringing nonetheless see no problem with parents’ subjecting their 
children to the parents’ own views—religious or otherwise—in ways that exceed the 
proper limits of the parental role, as I understand it. Parents’ rights need more than 
incremental revision; they have to be fundamentally reconceived.
The article proceeds in three sections. Section one presents the familial rela-
tionship goods account of parents’ rights. Section two explores the implications of 
that account for questions about the right to raise one’s child as a member of one’s 
religion. Section three focuses on the issue of religious schooling.
FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP GOODS AND PARENTS’ RIGHTS
To understand what rights parents should have over the children they parent, 
we have to start with what may seem like an odd question: why should children be 
raised by parents at all? The biological sense of “parent”—parent as procreator—is 
so common that it is natural to hear that question as asking why biological parents 
should get to raise the children they have produced. That question is indeed unset-
tling, but I mean to address a more fundamental issue. Properly to address the ques-
tion of parents’ rights we need to take a step further back and consider the reasons 
for wanting children to be raised in families, by parents—whether biological or adop-
tive—in the first place. Children’s upbringing could be handed over to state-run qua-
si-orphanages. Doubtless readers will baulk at that suggestion, but other forms of 
collective or communal child-raising, such as the kibbutz, are less dystopian. What, 
if anything, would be lost if we were to get rid of the family and go with these alterna-
tives? Only with a clear view of what is so valuable about the family, and the parent-
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child relationship in particular, can we think systematically about what rights parents 
need to have for that value to be realized.
Parent-child relationships make possible distinctive and weighty goods in peo-
ple’s lives. I will argue that a very particular kind of relationship with one or more (but 
not too many) adults is valuable for children: it is essential both for their emotional, 
cognitive and moral development and it contributes to their wellbeing during child-
hood itself. Since children are—at least initially—dependent, vulnerable and invol-
untary participants in the process of being raised, and since childhood experiences 
have formative influence on our lives as a whole, children’s interests matter most. So 
the case for the family depends primarily on parent-child relationships being good 
for children and the adults they become. But the wellbeing of adults is also affected 
in a different way by how children are raised, and many have an interest in getting to 
play the role of parent. In the world of state-run quasi-orphanages, children would 
lack the kind of relationships with particular adults that they need both to flourish 
as children and to develop into flourishing adults, while adults would be deprived of 
the special—distinctive and weighty—goods that many achieve through parenting a 
child.
Let me start with children. Children’s interests—the things that make their lives 
go well—can be categorized in various ways. They have current interests, which con-
tribute to their wellbeing during their childhoods, but they also have developmen-
tal interests—interests in developing the physical, cognitive, emotional and moral 
capacities that will enable their lives to go well as adults. Raising children well is a 
matter of getting something like the right balance between these various consider-
ations. Some of the things that children need could indeed be provided by imper-
sonal state functionaries: healthy nutrition, adequate clothing and protection from 
physical danger presumably fall into that category. But one does not have to be an 
expert in psychology or child development to know that healthy emotional devel-
opment depends on children forming deep attachments to particular adults who 
are emotionally attuned to them, whom they experience as loving them, as having a 
special duty of care towards them, and with whom they can enjoy long-term intimate 
relationships. More interestingly, perhaps, children also need to experience their at-
tentive carers as their central disciplinary models. To learn and internalize self-con-
trol, empathy, deferred gratification, and other modes of self-regulation, the child 
needs to see these traits modeled in people with whom she identifies; for children, 
identification comes through love and admiration, which are themselves responses 
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to loving warmth in the carer (Gerhardt 2004). Healthy emotional development, in 
other words, depends on children experiencing intimate-yet-authoritative relation-
ships with particular adults. That is the core of the child-centred case for parents and 
the family as the best way of raising children.
It is important, further, that those adults with authority over the child are experi-
enced by her as acting at least somewhat spontaneously, as expressing their own indi-
viduality and sharing themselves with their children, and as having the discretion to 
act on their own judgments. Someone who, when deciding what to cook for supper, 
or what stories to read at bedtime, robotically executes the detailed instructions con-
tained in an official state-approved child-raising manual will hardly be providing the 
kind of emotional responsiveness that tends to induce loving identification with the 
authority figure, nor herself experiencing the parent-child relationship as a source of 
joy and satisfaction in the way most helpful to the child’s emotional development. 
Some degree of external direction will doubtless not spoil the relationship. Parents’ 
administering medicines to their children according to doctors’ instructions are 
likely to be experienced as acting on an entirely healthy loving motivation. And, for 
some parents, following a more extensive “instruction manual”—such as a religious 
text—may be precisely how they manifest and share their own sense of what matters 
with their children. In such cases, however, it is significant that the parent is acting 
on her own judgment rather than experiencing the manual as an external imposition.
But the importance of that kind of relationship goes far beyond the child’s in-
terest in emotional wellbeing. Emotional, cognitive and moral development are so 
intertwined that parent-child relationships play a crucial role in these other dimen-
sions too. According to developmental psychologists, even basic mental processes 
like representational thinking, which is the precursor for symbolization and concep-
tual thought, and the capacity to imagine, which allows one to take the other’s point 
of view, depend on internalization of the caregiving relationship. As Anne C. Dailey 
(2006, p.130) puts it: “the capacity for reasoned thinking represents a developmental 
line, or maturational sequence, beginning in the earliest physical interactions with an 
emotionally responsive caregiver and ending in a mature complex capacity to lead an 
independent, autonomous, self-directed life”. The capacity for autonomy is complex 
partly in that it combines cognitive, emotional and moral aspects: the autonomous 
person can not only reflect on the options available to her, process information, and 
identify means to her ends; she can also trust and cooperate with others, defer gratifi-
cation, and contain disruptive and destructive feelings. That complex capacity is best 
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fostered when children are raised in intimate-yet-authoritative relationships with 
particular adults; i.e. when they are raised in families, by parents.
What about adults? What ways of raising children would be best for them? That 
might seem like a trick question. After all, all adults started out as children, and the 
last two paragraphs were mainly about the kind of upbringing that would be good 
for children not in the sense of being good for them during their childhoods but in 
the developmental sense of being good for them as the adults they will become. One 
response to the question, then, not falling for the trick, would be: “Adults are just 
developed children; they are the same people! So the way of raising children that is 
best for adults must be the same as the way that best serves children’s developmental 
interests.” Which is what we have just been talking about.
That way of formulating the question is salutary. In highlighting the fundamen-
tal continuity between children and adults it reminds us that the issue of how children 
should be raised just is the question of how people should be raised and makes it less 
likely that we will misjudge the balance of interests between children and the adults 
who raise them. But that doesn’t make it a trick question; there is indeed a residual 
issue about how different ways of organizing children’s upbringing might be good or 
bad for people-as-adults. The kind of developmental interests appealed to in the pre-
vious paragraphs were quite general—and their very generality helps to explain their 
importance. But there remain questions about the specific ways in which childrearing 
arrangements might contribute to the well-being of adults, and whether that contri-
bution might affect the overall judgment about how childrearing should be arranged. 
Suppose my story about why children need parents turns out to be false: robots can 
do the job just as well—maybe even a bit better—and it is proposed that we hand 
the task over to them. Parenting would be banned. Even though robot-raised people 
would suffer no other loss—and even if they enjoyed a gain in other ways—many 
would resist the proposal. Some might do so selfishly—just because it suited them 
to get to be a parent and the cost would be borne by others—but that need not be 
part of the argument. Looking at the issue impartially, one could reasonably think 
that parenting a child makes enough of a contribution to enough people’s lives that 
our collectively retaining that option would be worth missing out on whatever other 
benefits were produced by the robot scenario.
Nearly everybody agrees that the adult interest in parenting is weighty enough 
to ground a right to be a parent, that we would be failing in our duties to one another 
if we denied people the opportunity to engage in that activity. And certainly many 
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people make great efforts to become parents, regard raising a child as one of their 
most important life projects, and sacrifice lots of other valued opportunities in the 
process. But adults become parents for many different reasons and there is consider-
able dispute about how best to understand the value of parenting and the basis of the 
right to be a parent (Overall 2012). Some point to the significance of raising children 
as a way of extending or continuing oneself into the future, passing on some aspects 
of oneself to a child; those who take this kind of view can disagree about the specific 
nature of the extension or continuity that is valuable — perhaps it is one’s genes, 
perhaps one’s property, perhaps one’s religious identity (Reshef 2013). Others see 
raising a child primarily as a creative activity, or an opportunity for self-expression, a 
bit like an artist shaping a piece of marble into a sculpture (Page 1984, Macleod 2002). 
These different grounds for holding that there is a right to parent (i.e. the right to 
become a parent) will suggest different views about the rights of parents (i.e. the rights 
that parents have over their children)—including views about parents’ rights to influ-
ence their children’s values and beliefs.
The common problem with such accounts is that they make children means to 
their parents’ ends; the child is regarded, and treated, as a vehicle through which 
parents can achieve their own purposes. True, the child may not only be a means. If 
the interest in developing autonomy is satisfied, then a parent may plausibly claim that 
she has treated her child also as an end. Nonetheless, there is something inappropri-
ately self-serving about this kind of attempt to justify the claim to parent a child. Of 
course, what we are looking for is precisely a way in which parenting contributes to 
the well-being of the adults doing it, so some element of adult self-interest is unavoid-
able. But the interest in question must be distinctive and weighty enough to provide 
a plausible answer to the question of why adults should get to parent children even 
if robots would do a better job. There are many ways in which people can extend or 
continue themselves into the future, or express themselves creatively, without claim-
ing the right to control another human being. And there are different ways in which 
they can enjoy fulfilling and intimate relationships with others, so blanket appeals to 
the value of intimate affective relationships (such as that offered by Schoemann 1980) 
cannot succeed either. In my view, what is special about parenting, and important 
enough to count for something in the balance when weighed against our other inter-
ests, is the parents’ role as their children’s fiduciary. The parent has a special duty to 
protect and promote the child’s interests including the interest most children have in 
developing the capacity for autonomy and becoming someone who has no need of a 
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parent’s special duty of care. The idea that parents have fiduciary duties toward their 
children is familiar from Locke (Locke 1689/1988). The additional claim here is that 
adults have a non-fiduciary interest in being able to play a fiduciary role; it is valuable 
for their children that they play it well, but it is also a distinctive source of their own 
flourishing that they play it.
Some elements in what is special about being a fiduciary for a child concern the 
fact that what we’re talking about here is a child: relevant here are the distinctive prop-
erties and moral standing of the person for whom one is acting as fiduciary: her pos-
sessing the capacity to develop into an autonomous adult, her degree of vulnerability 
to one’s responses and judgments, her involuntary dependence on one, her natural 
tendency to develop a deep attachment to one. Failing adequately to discharge your 
fiduciary duties to a child would be different from failing to discharge those owed to 
a client or patient, or even to an ageing parent, even if what was involved in fulfill-
ing the duties were the same. But of course they are not the same. Other elements 
concern what it is that children need from their fiduciaries. As we have seen, they 
need a special kind of relationship—a relationship in which the adult offers love and 
authority, a complex and emotionally challenging combination of openness and re-
straint, of spontaneity and self-monitoring, of sharing and withholding. It’s that kind 
of relationship that many adults have an interest in too.
Imagine a world in which human children didn’t need much more looking after 
than guinea pigs, or Tamagotchi toys. Imagine that they could fully develop into au-
tonomous, emotionally adjusted adults, and enjoy the intrinsic goods of childhood, 
with that kind and level of input from adults. Even in that hypothetical world, there 
would be some value to being the person responsible for ensuring that children’s in-
terests were met. But what’s really valuable in the case of parenting is not being the 
fiduciary per se but having the kind of relationship that is, in fact, the kind that chil-
dren need to develop into healthy adults. It’s that kind of relationship which pres-
ents a distinctive challenge, and distinctive sources of fulfilment, which together give 
adults unique opportunities for flourishing.
Parents’ rights, on this account, are precisely the rights that parents need in order 
to have the kind of relationship that justifies children being raised by parents—rather 
than robots, state functionaries or interchangeable members of a commune—in the 
first place. We can assess on a case by case basis whether an appeal to familial rela-
tionship goods justifies parents’ claims to control—to exercise authority over—chil-
dren by looking at the role those rights play in realizing familial relationship goods. 
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Roughly, familial relationship goods give us strong reason to grant parents the rights 
they require to fulfil the fiduciary role, to create or sustain the kind of intimate-and-
authoritative relationship that children need and that is also valuable to the parent. 
The relationship goods approach helps us work out what room is necessary for the 
“free and flourishing internal life appropriate” to the family (Rawls 2001:165). Parents 
have the right to engage in those activities and interactions with their children that 
facilitate the realization of the extremely valuable goods that justify the family in the 
first place.
Parental claims to the right to do things to, with and for their children that 
cannot be justified by appeal to those goods may perhaps be defended in other ways; 
parents are not only parents and they may have other interests or prerogatives that 
can properly influence their dealings with their children. But those other consider-
ations will not ground parents’ rights as that category is understood here; they will 
not be rights that they have in virtue of being parents. As we will see, the question of 
whether such non- or extra-parental considerations mean that parents have the right 
to act on their religious views when deciding matters for their children, and in what 
ways, will be important when thinking about religious schooling.
This account of the nature and basis of parents’ rights is deliberately quite 
general. The next section will consider its implications for the issue of parents’ 
rights to shape their children’s emerging beliefs and values, and of religious beliefs 
and values in particular. Before moving on, however, it may be helpful to highlight a 
few features of the general approach proposed so far. In my view these are attractive, 
but readers may suspect some sleight of hand in the way the various elements of the 
picture fit together, so it is better to have them out in the open.
First, the thrust of the approach is to start from children’s interests and identify 
what it is that children need from adults. That starting point does much to generate 
the conclusion that parents’ rights are just those rights that it is in children’s inter-
ests for parents to have, and some may regard it as biased or prejudicial. Certainly 
it has profound and transformative implications for the way we think about famil-
ial relationships. But children’s vulnerability, their involuntary subject to control by 
another person, and the far-reaching implications of how they are raised for their 
lives as a whole suggest that any approach that gives greater weight to the interests 
of parents is indefensible. As Shelley Burtt (2002, p.17) puts it: “authority over other 
human beings should extend only so far as making up the deficits that legitimate 
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their subordination… the way we think of children and their needs determines the 
sort of authority we think it is appropriate to exercise over them”.
Second, the claim that the special value of parenting, for adults, consists in 
playing the fiduciary role—providing the kind of relationship that children need—is 
certainly controversial. Its effect is to change the picture of the relationship between 
parents and children in a way that massively reduces the scope for genuine conflicts 
of interest—and of rights—between the two. That may seem too good to be true. Of 
course, adults may want to be parents for a variety of reasons, and some may regard 
the proposed view about the distinctive value of parenthood as misidentifying what 
is at stake. Those who see their mission as populating the world with followers of a 
particular religious faith, or who view their children as means for them to express and 
realise their powers of creative self-expression, will think I neglect their true interests 
qua parents, and will leave greater scope for genuine conflicts between their own and 
their children’s interests. But such alternative specifications of the value of parenting 
do not provide plausible answers to the question of why people should have the right 
to parent children even when others—whether robots, state functionaries or simply 
other parents—would do a better job.
Third, the claim that parents’ rights are derivative of children’s interests means, 
in effect, that the adult interest in being a parent—the basis of the right to parent—
plays no further role in the argument. We will need to consider how their other in-
terests may properly influence parents’ relationships with their children, but from 
here on the adult interest in parenting drops out of the picture. My defence of a par-
ticular specification of that interest is important to the position as a whole, of course, 
because it challenges competing views that grant parents more extensive rights to 
shape their children’s values. But the effect of that defence was precisely to direct 
attention to what children need from their parents, and what rights parents must 
have in order to give them what they need. That is where our attention will indeed be 
directed from here on.
Fourth, autonomy plays a central role in the account. It is important that children 
develop the capacity for autonomy and parent-child relationships with a particular 
character are important for its development. As their fiduciaries, parents are charged 
with the task of facilitating the process whereby their children become capable of 
making independent and reflective decisions about how they are to live their lives. 
That process begins with a mixture of affective connection and clear and consis-
tent regulation—the “downloading” from the parent of the capacity to contain and 
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regulate her own desires and emotions—but as children begin to develop their own 
preferences and perspectives, it also requires parents to exercise the self-restraint 
that allows their children to begin to trust and act on their own judgments. That 
is challenging even for those parents who accept the importance of autonomy—it 
is hard to resist the temptation to use one’s authoritative position paternalistically, 
to attempt to shape one’s children’s beliefs, values and choices according to one’s 
own judgments about what it is to live well. But many reject that element of the fidu-
ciary picture and conceive their role precisely as deploying their parental authority to 
guide their children towards (their own views about) how best to live. Here, as I have 
said, we hit bedrock disagreement: those who deny the importance of autonomy will 
reject all liberal views, including standard approaches that treat the facilitation of 
children’s autonomy as an external constraint on parents. For them, my account—on 
which facilitating autonomy is internal to the parental role and helps to explain why 
there is a right to parent, even when others would do a better job—will only make 
matters worse.
PARENTS’ RIGHTS, CHILDREN’S RELIGION
We can now explore what this view about the basis and nature of parents’ rights 
means for their right to raise their children as members of a particular religion. Where 
other theorists see those rights as part of parents’ own expressive liberty (Galston 
2002, p.102) or as an implication of their own religious freedom as individuals (Fried 
1976, p.152), or as deriving from their own interest in a relationship with their chil-
dren based on shared identity (Reshef 2013, p.132) the approach proposed here frames 
the issue very differently. Suppose that an intimate-but-authoritative relationship is 
indeed important for children’s development, including the development of their au-
tonomy, and that parents’ rights should be derived entirely from the fiduciary aspect 
of the relationship. What are the implications for rights to control, or even to influ-
ence, the development of their children’s religious beliefs and identity?
Before addressing that question, we should be clear that, on the liberal picture, 
there is a big difference between people’s views about how they should live their own 
lives and their views about how others should be treated. The values that children 
need to acquire as part of their moral development—the liberal virtues such as tol-
erance, respect for others, and what Rawls (1962) calls “a sense of justice”—have a 
different status from the kind that individuals may choose to endorse as a matter of 
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private conscience, such as those attaching to full-blown religious systems or ethical 
doctrines. To put it crudely, it is much more important that people get to form and act 
on their own views about the former than about the latter: the fact that we owe duties 
to others—that we are morally required to treat them in certain ways—means that 
people’s views about how to treat others do not demand the same kind of respect as 
their judgments about how to live their own lives more generally. This gives parents 
a very different role in the formation of their children’s moral views from that which 
is appropriate in the case of their religious beliefs. I said earlier that the parent-child 
relationship itself is justified partly because of the role that parents play in children’s 
moral development; the important point here is that some deliberate shaping of their 
children’s emerging values is itself part of that job. There will be other influences, 
of course, but instilling in children the virtue of honesty, the ability to distinguish 
right from wrong, and the sense that others are moral equals irrespective of their skin 
colour, religion, or gender, is a task primarily charged to parents and part of their fi-
duciary duty to their children (as well as being in the interest of third parties).
Returning to the particular issue of religion, parents’ role is to serve as loving 
authorities—to exercise the kind of discretion and induce the kind of identification 
that children need for their own development, including their moral development—
while helping their children acquire the capacity to judge religious matters for them-
selves. That is a challenging job description, especially for parents with deep religious 
convictions (including atheism). To develop the kind of attachment that children 
need, they must gradually get to know their parents—who they are, what they care 
about—and parents must be free to be spontaneous, and to share themselves with 
their children. To conceal their religious views, or not to allow those views in any way 
to inform their exercise of parental authority, would require a kind of withholding, 
and a degree of self-monitoring, that is inimical to an intimate loving relationship. 
Parents whose religious convictions require them to say prayers before eating, for 
example, or prescribe and proscribe particular kinds of food, must have some discre-
tion to act on those beliefs in the way they conduct family life. Apart from anything 
else, loving parents are naturally motivated to benefit their children, and religious 
views affect what is regarded as “benefit”. A parent who believes that her child will be 
condemned to eternal damnation unless she comes to endorse a particular doctrine 
cannot entirely bracket that belief in her relationship with the child without depriv-
ing the child of at least some of those very expressions of parental love that the child 
needs. But precisely because, when all goes well, children love and identify with their 
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parents—want to please them, want to be like them—that same relationship inevi-
tably threatens the autonomy that it is also the parent’s task to develop. So not only 
must children be exposed to other beliefs at appropriate ages, and in such a way that 
other ways of life become genuine options for them, but also those very processes 
of attachment and identification with the parent that are needed on developmental 
grounds have to be carefully managed so that those alternatives are not unthinkable, 
or adoptable only at excessive emotional cost.
On the proposed account of parents’ rights, then, parents must have the right 
to act in ways that will tend to influence their children’s religious views. In a healthy 
parent-child relationship, a parent’s religious views are bound to shape those of her 
children. Some influence will arise simply as a result of parents being themselves in 
their relationships with their children, and exercising in a more or less unreflective 
and personal way their sphere of discretion over the particular ways in which they 
interact with them. Some will arise from parents’ acting on their natural motivation 
to help their children’s lives go better. A loving parent who thinks that her child will 
benefit if she loves God is bound to find herself nudging her in that direction simply 
because of her automatic and natural tendency to relate to her child in ways that she 
thinks will be good for her. The same applies to the loving parent who decries belief 
in God as the opiate of the masses, or regards it as an irrational projection of human 
psychological needs. Parents will naturally tend to denigrate, and unthinkingly steer 
their children away from, what they take to be bad influences. The idea that parents 
should constantly monitor themselves in order to screen out anything that might in-
fluence their children’s views about religion would risk distancing them, creating ar-
tifice in the relationship, and depriving their children of the possibility of the warm, 
spontaneous, genuine relationship that they need. Most of us cannot simultaneously 
shield our children from those values and commitments that are central to our iden-
tities and spontaneously share ourselves with them in the way that the healthy par-
ent-child relationship demands.
I have emphasized the significance of unmonitored discretion and spontaneity, 
but what does the account imply for parents’ right deliberately to act in ways likely 
to influence to their children’s religious beliefs? To answer that we must distinguish 
two things that might be going on under that description. On the one hand, a parent 
might be deliberately directing her child towards a particular faith—or towards a re-
jection of any—in the sense that she intends that the child come to endorse her own 
view. That, of course, is a right that parents conventionally claim—and that they are 
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everywhere granted. On the other hand, the parent may simply be trying to give her 
child the right kind of relationship. Even if she does not herself consciously frame 
things in such terms, her aim, in this second case, is to provide her child with the “fa-
milial relationship goods” that, if I am right, explain why she has any rights at all over 
the child. Here the influencing of her children’s religious views, though deliberate, is 
ultimately motivated by a concern that her relationship with the child should go well.
Parents who see themselves as justified in deliberately guiding their children 
towards their own religious views, in the first sense, have misunderstood their role 
and the moral character of the parent-child relationship. If the relationship goods 
approach is right, children are of course helping parents to realize familial relation-
ship goods in their lives, and their parents may have chosen to be parents for that 
very reason. Still, that approach gives parents no permission to treat their children as 
means by which they may permissibly seek to realize their own values in other ways, 
or to pursue their own, controversial, conception of how one should live. Asked 
“Why should adults get to exercise authority over children?”, we are not tempted to 
answer: “So that they can direct children towards their preferred religious doctrine”. 
Typically, then, when parents deliberately direct their children on religious matters, 
they are deploying their power improperly. This is certainly true of those parents who 
try to direct their children’s religious views without regard to the development of 
their children’s autonomy—i.e. their capacity to judge such matters for themselves. 
But it can be true also of parents who do take their children’s moral separateness seri-
ously in that way. Recall Burtt’s (2002:17) nice articulation of the principle at stake: 
“authority over other human beings should extend only so far as making up the def-
icits that legitimate their subordination”. Even where their concern to guide their 
children towards the true path is motivated entirely by a loving concern for their 
children’s wellbeing, it is not their proper role, as parents, to exercise parental author-
ity in that way. This is consistent with the view that parents may be distinctively well 
placed to discern their children’s particular developing talents and emerging inter-
ests, and on that basis may legitimately exercise their authority in ways conducive to 
their wellbeing (Richards 2016).
But parents may deliberately introduce their children to their religious views, or 
their views about religion, in ways that can be understood as part of the sharing with, 
or revealing to, the child that is itself conducive to the kind of relationship I have 
described. Here there need be no intention that the child should come to endorse 
the views in question. I have emphasized the extent to which parents’ revealing and 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 ADAM SWIFT48
sharing their religious commitments would naturally result from the spontaneous, 
unmonitored, quality of the relationship, but a parent may be right to think that 
the relationship will go better if she also acts in a considered way to show her child 
who she is and what she cares about. When a Christian parent takes his daughter 
to church, that is not usually an unthinking and automatic sharing of self between 
parent and child. It is more likely a deliberate decision to introduce the child to a 
world of belief and practice that the parent judges valuable. To be sure, that introduc-
tion is typically motivated by the desire that the child will come to share that judg-
ment, but it need not be. The same applies to deliberate decisions to say prayers at 
certain times, such as before meals. The parent might require her child to engage in 
such practices as a way of introducing the child to the parent’s religious views, believ-
ing that her relationship with the child will be closer—the child will know her parent 
better—if the child experiences those practices for herself.
This justification extends to deliberate and considered parental exercises of 
authority the same claim that underpinned the case for spontaneous, unmonitored 
interactions between parent and child. The thought is that, for the relationship prop-
erly to serve children, there needs to be a kind of emotional bond and mutual identi-
fication that is incompatible with the requirement that parents withhold and conceal 
their own views on religious matters. To confine parents to the spontaneous expres-
sion of those views—to deny them the freedom deliberately to reveal their views to 
their children, including by means that involve controlling their children’s behavior, 
such as taking them to church—would be to do children a disservice.
Perhaps paradoxically, the possibility of children’s rejecting their parents’ re-
ligious commitments is another reason why exposure—including deliberate expo-
sure—to those commitments can be in children’s interests. Everything in the last 
few paragraphs has assumed that, whatever else they are doing to and with their 
children, parents are not obstructing the development of their children’s autonomy. 
Autonomous individuals can make up their own minds about what to believe, and 
they may well end up believing different things from their parents. If we think not 
only about the developmental benefits of parent-child relationships but also about 
their value when people reach adulthood, it seems that, where the child does break 
from the parents’ values, the parent-child relationship will probably be sustained in a 
more meaningful way, and has a better chance of being sustained, if child and parent 
are in a position at least to appreciate the other’s point of view, to understand where 
the other is coming from. (For views that emphasize the value of familial relation-
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ships’ continuing into adulthood see Reshef (2013) and, especially, Ferracioli (2015).) 
In the child’s case, that can only happen if the parent has indeed made sure that the 
child has a real appreciation of how she lives her life and how she sees the world.
This view about the permissibility of parents’ deliberately introducing their 
children to their religious views when it is important for their relationship raises 
a number of complexities. One concerns how much of an “introduction” is really 
needed for the child to relate to her parent in the way that the account requires. One 
visit to a Church, temple, mosque or synagogue is hardly going to do the job, but it is 
implausible to regard this justification as permitting parents to require weekly visits 
for many years, or to demand that their children acquire a level of familiarity with 
the doctrine in the way that might justify requiring a high level of religious instruc-
tion. The thought is that children should have a sense of who their parents are, and 
what matters to them, not that they should develop an advanced understanding of 
the views to which their parents subscribe. The same applies to practices like praying. 
Even if it is permissible for parents to introduce their children to such a practice, that 
will not justify its becoming part of their daily routine, or at least not for long.
The example of praying raises a distinctive concern about the permissibility of 
requiring children themselves to engage in particular practices rather than merely 
observing their parents, and other adults, do so. One can imagine a parent maintain-
ing that it is only by, say, actually praying to a divine being that one understands what 
it means to pray to that divine being, or to any divine being, and that without that 
experience a child will not really have been “introduced” to those things that matter 
to the parent. To lessen the oddity of that claim, consider that a parent who wor-
ships Beethoven is presumably permitted to take her child to a concert, and make her 
listen to the music, not just to observe others doing so. Of course, praying to a divine 
being seems to presuppose beliefs—such as that the divine being exists—of a kind 
that some regard as distinctively objectionable but the familial relationship goods 
account nonetheless has scope for that level and kind of deliberate introduction.
Third, a parent who exercises parental authority in a way that is likely to influ-
ence her child’s religious views, albeit without any intention of doing so and moti-
vated only by relationship considerations, may nonetheless hope that the exposure 
will result in the child’s coming to endorse the parent’s own views. It is demand-
ing enough to expect a parent committed to particular religious views to respect her 
child’s moral separateness not only by facilitating the development of her autonomy 
but also by abjuring any action intended to guide her towards those views. It would 
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be psychologically impossible for such a parent not even to wish that the child will 
autonomously come to share them. Indeed, a parent who did not even want her child 
to choose what, ex hypothesi, she regards as the best way to live would surely be failing 
to provide the kind of loving relationship the child needs.
We will soon move on from this general discussion of parents’ rights to raise 
their children as members of a religion to the issue of schooling in particular. To lay 
the ground, a few more features of the proposed approach are worth bringing out. 
Most important is the point that parents constitute a standing threat to their chil-
dren’s independence, understood as their capacity to choose their own lives. Close, 
intimate-but-authoritative, relationships between parents and children are vital, but 
such relationships can easily be too close. Even those influences that arise sponta-
neously in a loving parent-child relationship can threaten autonomy; that threat is 
all the greater where influence arises as a result of the parent’s deliberate decision 
to share herself with her child. In all cases, parents mindful of their duties to their 
children will take care not to engage in the kinds of revealing and sharing that will 
impede the development of the child’s capacity to make her own judgments about 
whatever is being shared and revealed. What kinds will in fact do that partly depends, 
of course, on the child’s age or stage of development. For young children, the empha-
sis can be on fostering the processes of identification and attachment. As they mature 
and become able to question their parents’ views, the balance needs to shift toward 
facilitating the process of separation and individuation.
So far I have talked about “religious views” in the abstract, paying no attention 
to their content or the differences between them. But different religious doctrines can 
have very different implications for children’s developing autonomy, and the extent 
to which parents may share their religious views with their children will vary accord-
ingly. In a healthy parent-child relationship, children are naturally inclined to iden-
tify with their parents, and to seek their parents’ approval. So it makes a difference 
what it is that parents do and do not approve. Other things equal, children whose 
parents reveal their belief that all who do not subscribe to their own religion are 
wicked, or condemned to eternal damnation, are likely to find it harder to break with 
their parents’ religious views than those whose parents hold more moderate views. 
Given the variety in people’s constitutions and characters, children who know that 
their parents regard homosexuality as wicked, or girls who learn that their parents see 
motherhood and homemaking as divinely ordained for women, may find it harder to 
live a life that is right for them than those whose parents take a more tolerant line. On 
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the other hand, where a religious doctrine itself puts great weight on the importance 
of people critically judging its validity for themselves and living according to their 
consciences, or simply regards what is at stake in such judgments as less weighty, 
there will be fewer obstacles to children’s developing their own views on religious 
matters; it may even be positively encouraged.
My view about parental rights, then, is not “neutral” between different religious 
views. Indeed, those who reject the claim that parents are under a fiduciary duty to 
facilitate their children’s autonomy will already have found that conception of the 
parental role to be biased against religious doctrines that deny the importance of 
autonomy. So it is no surprise that the view permits parents whose religious views 
themselves endorse liberal values to share their views with their children in ways 
that may be impermissible for those who do not. This is not an embarrassment—
but it does point to a paradox. On my account, it is parents whose religious convic-
tions do not put much, or any, weight on autonomy who must be most careful about 
sharing those convictions with children—for the sake of their children’s autonomy. 
While the argument is indeed unlikely to have much motivational traction with such 
parents—since they will simply reject the initial account of their parental duties—
that is no objection. Nor is the fact that my view yields differential implications for 
believers in different religions. Both simply show how much rests on the validity of 
that account.
But what about parents whose religious convictions are such that it is simply 
psychologically impossible for them to have the kind of relationship their children 
need without exceeding the constraints on the exercise of parental authority that I 
have argued for? Consider someone who is convinced that her child will suffer eternal 
damnation, or merely that he will live a worthless life, unless he comes to endorse her 
own doctrine. Her spontaneous sharing and revealing of herself is bound to exert a 
level of emotional pressure that is inimical to the child’s enjoying a genuinely “open 
future”. And there may be no way for her to refrain from deliberately guiding him 
towards a doctrine the endorsement of which will have (she believes) such a huge 
impact on his wellbeing: there may be no gap, for her, between acting in ways that the 
child needs her to act if he is to feel loved, on the one hand, and at least nudging him 
towards a flourishing life, on the other. Here, it seems, there is no morally costless 
resolution to the conflict. Such a parent is unable to provide her child with the kind 
of loving relationship that the child needs without simultaneously threatening her 
autonomy and exceeding the proper limits on her parental authority in the process.
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To be sure, in such cases we might excuse the parent’s wrongful treatment of her 
children. To find oneself unable to give one’s child the love he needs without failing 
fully to acknowledge his independent moral status is very different from simply treat-
ing him as a means to a greater good or as a vehicle for the pursuit of one’s own pref-
erences. To see this, and to differentiate between different kinds of failure, imagine 
the children of four kinds of religious parent. First, one whose parents, entirely un-
concerned for his wellbeing or agency, see him only as a means for increasing the 
number of true believers in the world; second, one whose parents love him and care 
for his wellbeing, but, confident in their belief that they know what is best for him, 
show no concern at all for his autonomy; third, one whose parents, though mindful 
of their duty not to hamper his capacity for autonomy, have strong religious convic-
tions of such a kind that, despite their best efforts, spontaneous family life makes it 
hard for him to develop and exercise it; fourth, one whose parents, while careful to 
ensure that he does develop the capacity for autonomy, find that their love for him 
sometimes takes the form of deliberately guiding him towards their own religious 
views.
Although, if my account is right, all four exceed the proper limits of the paren-
tal role, it seems clear that they do so to different, and decreasing, degrees. All these 
children have a complaint against their parents, but those complaints become pro-
gressively less severe. In the first case, there is a complete absence of concern for the 
child; in the second, a failure to recognize the importance of the child’s being able 
to form and act on her own religious views. The third and fourth cases have a more 
subtle relation to my proposed account. In both, the parents are well motivated and 
are providing their child with the right kind of relationship—the problem is that, 
given their religious views, the only way they can do that either impedes the child’s 
autonomy (third case) or involves a regrettable compromise between different aspects 
of the parental role (fourth case). In these two cases we can readily imagine the child 
forgiving or excusing his parents—after all, they were doing their best for him, given 
their convictions—and their misjudgments about their proper role were less serious. 
(See Cormier (2018) for the related thought that, where parents’ deliberate shaping of 
children’s values can be justified as necessary for the kind of relationship that chil-
dren need to develop autonomy, children might retrospectively consent to it.)
I want to end by considering two objections to the proposed view of the rights 
that parents have to influence their children’s religious views. Both worry that I go too 
far in prioritizing children’s interests and do not give enough weight to parents’, and 
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both will be relevant to the question of religious schooling. First, imagine a critic who 
says: “I’m willing to grant not only your suggestion that parents’ rights are those that 
are needed to fulfil the parental role but also your account of what the parental role 
is. I’ll even accept your view about what that means for parents’ rights with respect 
to their children’s religious upbringing. But parents are not only parents. As you said 
at the beginning, they are individuals with their own lives to lead. Surely there must 
be some scope for them to lead those lives in ways that suit them, and for those ways 
to affect their interactions with their children, even if they are not thereby serving 
their children’s interests”. The suggestion here is that a full account of how parents 
may treat their children must take account of non-parental rights, rather than relying 
entirely on an account of rights defined in terms of the parental role and its fiduciary 
responsibilities. Alternatively, suppose someone says: “I agree with you that parents’ 
dealings with their children must be constrained by the duty to facilitate their chil-
dren’s autonomy and in other ways to provide children with the kind of relationship 
that serves their interests. But, as long as they meet those demanding conditions, I 
don’t see why their rights with respect to their treatment of their children shouldn’t 
also reflect their own views about what matters in life. Rather than merely “hoping” 
that her child will come to endorse her own views, surely a parent should be permit-
ted deliberately to guide him towards them.” The issue here is whether we should 
adopt a “strict” or “lax” interpretation of parents’ rights. On the strict view, parents 
are limited to those exercises of authority that are demanded by children’s interest in 
familial relationship goods; on the lax view, they have more discretion.
Although analytically distinct—one appeals to non-parental rights, the other 
adopts a lax interpretation of parents’ rights themselves—these two objections make 
a similar point. Both deny that parents should be limited in their dealings with their 
children to those interactions that they need to engage in to fulfil the parental role 
and provide the requisite relationship goods; both hold that there is some space for 
them to act on their own preferences where doing so is not justified by their children’s 
interests—as long they do not thereby fail to deliver what their children need from 
the relationship. Although more sympathetic to the former way of formulating the 
point—which leaves my proposed analysis of parents’ rights intact—I will treat them 
together.
In my view, the general objection gets something right: parents’ interactions with 
their children may permissibly sometimes reflect their own preferences. Not only in 
the spontaneous, unmonitored way discussed above, but also as a result of deliber-
Journal of Practical Ethics
 ADAM SWIFT54
ate considered decision. Parents are people too and it is reasonable for the shared life 
of the family to reflect their own enthusiasms and interests to some extent. This is 
partly because it is in children’s interests that their parents are experienced as people 
with lives of their own. The familial relationship goods account itself emphasizes the 
value, to children, of parents’ sharing themselves—who they are and what matters 
to them—with their children. But, even where these distinctively familial relation-
ships are not at stake, i.e. where a parent cannot claim that a particular choice about 
how to exercise authority is serving her children’s interests, she should be able to 
continue, at least to some extent, her own, independent, life, by, for example, taking 
her children with her on holiday to places she wants to see, or to visit friends of hers. 
This is so even though doing that kind of thing tends to influence, as it surely will, 
the values and beliefs her children will come to hold. It is in children’s interests that 
their parents take them on holiday; at that level of description the exercise of author-
ity does indeed comply with Burtt’s (2002:17) claim that “authority over other human 
beings should extend only so far as making up the deficits that legitimate their sub-
ordination”. But that principle is too strict if it is taken also to apply to the particular 
choice of destination, which—precisely because parents are adults with their own 
lives to lead—may properly reflect the parent’s own interests and enthusiasms.
None of this, however, justifies the use of parental authority deliberately to guide 
or direct children towards particular religious views. They are, obviously, free to 
explain the merits of their preferred doctrines to other adults; in this and other ways 
they can live their religious lives as they see fit when it comes to those over whom 
they do not exercise authority and who are not captive audiences. But their authority 
over their children derives from children’s interests in a relationship of a certain sort, 
not from their own interest in pursuing and promoting their own religious convic-
tions. If they want to visit a holy place and their children’s interests are served by 
turning the trip into a family outing, then they make take their children with them. 
In doing so, they are not exercising a distinctively parental right; they are pursuing 
their non-parental interests in a way that permissibly affects their children. And since 
those children had no say in the matter of who their parents are, and have no escape 
from subjection to parental authority, those non-parental interests may permissibly 
be pursued only where doing so is compatible with discharging their fiduciary duties.
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RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Religious schools come in many shapes and sizes. They cater to children of dif-
ferent ages. Some are funded by the public purse, some rely on private resources. 
Some accept only children raised in a particular faith, others offer them preferen-
tial access, still others take no account of the religious background of their would-be 
students when choosing whom to educate. They vary in their purposes: some seek 
to direct their students towards a particular faith; others offer a non-directive and 
autonomy-promoting education that is nonetheless intended for those raised in a 
particular religious tradition and suffused by its ethos; still others aim to educate all 
children, without regard to their religious origins or destinations, albeit in a way that 
is somehow informed by a particular religious standpoint. These cross-cutting differ-
ences generate many distinct types of religious school. Contrast, for example, a pub-
lically funded school for children aged between 5 and 11 that, while mildly religious in 
its ethos, is equally available to all and makes no attempt to guide its students towards 
any particular faith with a privately funded school for children aged 13-18 that admits 
only those who identify as members of a particular religion and teaches that doctrine 
as truth. My account of parent’s rights might mean that we are morally required to 
respect their freedom to choose of some of these types but not others.
In general terms, the implications of that account for issues concerning religious 
schooling are rather straightforward. Most obviously, the duty to ensure that their 
children develop the capacity for autonomy precludes forms of education—whether 
at school or in the home—that deny children the knowledge, skills, attitudes and 
dispositions needed for them to make and act on their own judgments about the 
variety of ways in which they might choose to live their lives. Children are wronged 
if they do not learn about a range of different views on religious matters. And they 
are wronged if, though informed about that range, alternative views are presented in 
ways that preclude their coming to see them as real, rather than merely hypothetical, 
options—whether because the alternatives are presented as unworthy in themselves 
or because of the excessive emotional and psychological cost of choosing them. This 
implication—which applies to private or independent schools just as much as to those 
funded by citizens collectively, and to schools propounding atheism just as much as 
to those promoting other religious views—is already enough to impugn a great deal 
of the schooling that is tolerated throughout the world.
Though widely rejected in practice, the state’s duty to protect children’s au-
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tonomy is fairly uncontroversial among liberal political philosophers. True, by fo-
cusing on the fiduciary nature of the parental role—which includes the duty to help 
their children to become autonomous—and on the interest in playing that role as the 
basis of the right to be a parent in the first place, my view offers a distinctive frame. 
Where most theorists would see the state as restricting parents’ rights for the sake 
of children’s interests, I suggest a more integrated, less conflictual, way of concep-
tualizing the issues. But the implications of the familial relationship goods approach 
for religious schooling go beyond providing a new frame for a familiar conclusion. 
If I am right, parents do not have the right to send their children to schools that will 
direct them towards a particular religion, or away from all religions, even where those 
schools also succeed in providing the kind of autonomy-facilitating education that 
is demanded by the more conventional liberal position. The fact that one is a child’s 
parent does not give one the authority deliberately to guide her towards one’s own 
religious views even in the conduct of family life at home. It certainly doesn’t justify 
sending her to a school for that purpose.
Might the familial relationship goods account of parents’ rights offer alternative 
justifications for parents’ decisions to educate their children in religious schools? In 
the previous section, I noted the difference between the spontaneous and deliber-
ate mechanisms by which parents might influence their children’s religious views. 
Clearly sending one’s child to a particular kind of school cannot be regarded as the 
kind of unplanned, un-self-monitored, interaction that parents need to be free to 
engage in for family life to go well. Just as choosing elite private schooling differs from 
spontaneous helping with homework (Brighouse and Swift, p.142), so the proper 
concern to protect valuable familial interactions from counterproductive regulation 
or self-monitoring yields no support for religious schooling. I also suggested that, 
since parents are not only parents, it is permissible for them to pursue their own in-
dependent interests, at least to some extent, in ways that could be expected to exert 
that kind of effect. While it’s true that participation in a school’s activities, and other 
forms of association with co-believers facilitated by a shared school, might serve par-
ent’s own interest in pursuing their religious life, directing their children to attend 
such a school is different from, for example, taking them on holiday to visit a site of 
religious significance. In the latter, the parent is deliberately pursuing her own inter-
ests through her choice of the particular activity by which she is playing the fiduciary 
role. The former has no equivalent justification.
But I also considered various ways in which the proposed account might regard 
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deliberate decisions likely to influence their children’s religious views as legitimate ex-
ercises of parental authority, so there remains a question about whether any of them 
apply to religious schooling. Before getting on to those, let me bring out one more 
general point about the relation between family and school. Where many see the 
school as an extension of the home, with parental authority naturally extending from 
home to school, the account I have proposed instead regards the school as a correc-
tive to the home, a crucial safeguard against the risks that inevitably confront those 
engaging in the challenging task of parenting. The former view has no problem with, 
and may even prize, continuity between family and school; the latter sees discontinu-
ity as valuable in assisting parents to discharge their fiduciary duties to their children.
Raising children to become autonomous adults is challenging, especially for 
parents with strong religious convictions. For their healthy emotional, moral and 
cognitive development, young children need to feel securely attached to, and to 
identify with, their parents. Yet attachment and identification themselves can easily 
hamper the development of children’s capacity to make and act on their own judg-
ments about who they are, what matters to them, and how they want to live their 
lives. Although the familial relationship goods account insists that parents should 
be mindful of the ways in which the conduct of family life may pose dangers to that 
development, it leaves room for spontaneous, un-self-monitored, familial interac-
tions that have the potential to obstruct it even though they fall within the scope of 
parents’ discretionary authority. And quite apart from these psychological develop-
mental factors, even well-intentioned parents may simply be badly placed to provide 
their children with the requisite knowledge, skills attitudes and dispositions. Schools 
exist partly because parents cannot be expected to educate their children properly 
on their own—think about science, mathematics, humanities. The same applies to 
autonomy. It is through schooling that the state is most easily able to supply the raw 
materials needed for autonomy: through the curriculum children can experience in-
tellectual and emotional encounters with ideas, values, and traditions that are dif-
ferent from, and sometimes conflict with, those they are raised with in the home. 
Perhaps more importantly, in a socially and culturally diverse school they can become 
acquainted with different ideas, values and traditions through the friendships they 
make and through intimate interactions with their friends’ families. A culturally 
diverse teaching force can provide children with a range of adult role models who are 
unlike them and whom they can come to admire. A robust and well-designed extra-
curriculum can lead them to discover enthusiasms and interests that would never 
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have been stimulated by their home culture. Discontinuity is educationally valuable 
(Brighouse 2005).
Somewhat simplistically, then, the more a school takes on the task of promot-
ing children’s autonomy, the less parents need to worry about the autonomy-inhib-
iting effects of the ways in which, on my account, they may permissibly interact with 
their children. We might think of this as a division of labour between family/home 
and school. The former meets children’s affective, emotional and psychological de-
velopmental needs through intimate-but-authoritative relationships with particular 
adults. The latter supplements and complements that familial contribution by wid-
ening children’s horizons, by introducing them to perspectives different from those 
they are exposed to at home, and by teaching them to reflect critically on the choices 
available to them concerning how they are to live their lives.
The division of labour cannot be complete. However well they play their part, 
schools have only limited potential to counteract the threat that parents pose to their 
children’s autonomy, so we should not think that an appropriately constituted school 
system could leave parents free to conduct family life along religious lines (Weinstock 
2018). Parents can adopt strategies to immunize their children from the autonomy-
facilitating lessons and experiences that the school provides. Those strategies may 
sometimes fail, but they will succeed often enough for parents’ choices about how to 
respond to schools’ attempts to promote critical reflection on the values they them-
selves hold to remain important. Even where parents make no deliberate attempts 
at immunization, the emotional pull of their parents’ enthusiasms will be enough to 
prevent many children from responding to the schools’ messages. This is especially 
likely if parents take the awareness that another institution is taking care of autono-
my as giving them the freedom to be completely uninhibited in their promotion of—
or even the non-directive revealing and sharing of—their own values. And because 
it is important that schools not damage healthy familial relationships, the autonomy-
promoting role of schools itself places limits on what parents may teach children at 
home. Consider parents who, thinking themselves freed from the responsibility for 
promoting their child’s autonomy by the presence of an autonomy-facilitating school, 
teach her that homosexuality, or apostasy, are sins punishable by eternal damnation. 
One can easily imagine that what the school would have to do to facilitate that child’s 
autonomy would interfere with the familial relationship. The same applies to parents 
who are deeply hostile to anything other than atheism. We cannot relieve parents of 
the duty to participate conscientiously in developing their child’s autonomy.
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On the question of whether deliberate choices for religious schools might be 
justified by appeal to familial relationship goods, there are a number of different sce-
narios to consider. I argued, first, that a parent might be justified in sharing himself 
with, or revealing himself to, his child in ways that go beyond spontaneous informal 
interactions. He might permissibly take his child to his place of worship, for example, 
and he might even require her to experience—and not merely observe—some aspects 
of his religious practice. As far as schooling is concerned, this suggests a right at 
most to a school that will teach the child about her parents’ religion. Whether that 
implies a school with a distinct religious ethos is far from clear: one could imagine a 
secular school system teaching children enough about their parents’ various religious 
views that no supplementation was required. In some contexts, perhaps, this ratio-
nale might extend to sending one’s child to Sunday school, or its equivalent in other 
faiths, but only for a limited period and again, and crucially, only where the faith is 
presented in non-directive terms. The point is to inform and educate the child about 
the parents’ views—ex hypothesi in ways that the parent cannot do at home—not to 
guide her towards their endorsement. Where parents do indeed need to draw on this 
kind of ancillary provision, they should bear the cost privately, just as non-religious 
parents are expected to use their own resources when sharing their sporting or cul-
tural enthusiasms with their children.
What are the schooling implications of cases where parents’ religious views are 
such that they can only give their children the loving relationship they need if they 
are deliberately directing those children towards (their view of) the truth on religious 
matters? These are those parents for whom sharing, revealing and hoping are not 
enough. I suggested that they should be regarded as wronging their children—even 
if excusably so, and even if their children might reasonably forgive them—with the 
degree of wrong varying across different specifications of the case. The state cannot 
police familial interactions within the home without denying parents the discretion 
they need to discharge their relationship duties—so it has to permit parents the space 
to misuse their authority in that context—but, at least in principle, it can identify 
schools that are complicit in those wrongs. To ban religious schooling that guides 
children towards a particular religious view is to protect children from the illegiti-
mate exercise of parental authority. This is so even where that schooling also pro-
vides them with the capacity for autonomy.
Readers may wonder whether my claim about the value of discontinuity applies 
to children at all ages. Given my focus on the developmental significance of parent-
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child relationships and the obvious point that healthy development involves chil-
dren’s relationships with their parents changing over time, it may seem strange that 
I have felt able to ignore the difference between pre-school children and those at 
primary school, or between primary and secondary education. Even those who agree 
that a concern for autonomy rules out religious schooling at the secondary stage may 
think that it is permissible that children attend primary schools that immerse them 
in a particular religious tradition and teach them to reason in accordance with the 
ethical framework that it provides. One reason offered for that view is precisely that 
it is important, for the development of autonomy itself, that a young child’s school 
experience be consonant with the primary culture that she receives at home. If they 
are to develop the kind of secure and stable identity that is a precondition of autono-
my, young children need their schooling to reinforce the messages they get from their 
parents, not to undermine them (MacMullen 2007, ch.8). 
Suppose this claim is right. It leaves the issue of primary schooling hostage to the 
way that parents choose to conduct life within the home. Parents can indeed instill in 
their young children such firm religious beliefs, and beliefs about issues of such high 
stakes (such as a fear of eternal damnation), that those children may suffer if they are 
informed about, never mind encouraged to consider the merits of, alternative views. 
The same can apply in the case of more moderate doctrines, if family life is so suffused 
with religious practice and observance that children experience the world entirely in 
its terms. Some of the harm may be specifically to the stability of their identity, and 
affect the development of autonomy that way, some may be to the familial relation-
ship more generally. What this shows is the extent of the power that parents have 
over their children—which is why it matters so much that they not exceed its proper 
exercise. The familial relationship goods account of parents’ rights permits parents 
to share and reveal their religious views but not the deliberate, let alone systematic, 
direction of children towards those views. We cannot—should not—police what 
goes on within the home, so public policy with respect to religious schooling will 
doubtless have a remedial aspect, adjusting itself to parents’ illegitimate choices and 
doing the best for children in the circumstances. But if parents observe the proposed 
constraints, children will not need to be protected from different perspectives, even 
at the primary stage of education.
This last point takes us into questions about non-ideal circumstances. My argu-
ment has been pitched at a purely philosophical level, bracketing real-world consider-
ations and enquiring into the nature of parents’ rights over their children’s religious 
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upbringing in a rather abstract and idealised manner. The focus has been almost en-
tirely on what freedoms the state must, in principle, grant in that domain and on 
how parents may permissibly exercise those freedoms if granted. This question about 
how policy should respond to parents’ exceeding their legitimate authority in the 
home is just one of many issues that demand attention once we factor in the various 
different ways that parents, or policies, may fall short of the prescribed ideals. For 
example, most of my arguments apply both to private schools and to those that are 
publicly funded; going back to basics means denying the public/private distinction 
its conventional status as an organizing principle to guide policy. But it remains an in-
teresting and important question how the state sector should respond if, as is in fact 
the case—and as many believe it should be—the regulation of independent religious 
schools, or of homeschooling, is less strict than that of schools funded at taxpayers’ 
expense. Just as parents’ acting beyond the proper limits on their power over their 
children may warrant remedial special measures when it comes to primary school-
ing, so policies for the public sector may justifiably be affected by the other options 
that are available. It could be appropriate to adjust the regulation of state schools so 
as to accommodate parental preferences and thereby reduce parental exit into even 
less regulated private alternatives. Another example concerns the situation, where 
one particular religion—such as the Church of England—is granted privileged status 
within the state system. It may be wrong that Anglican parents can send their chil-
dren to schools that endorse their preferred religion, but it may also be unfair that 
they can do so while members of other faiths cannot. Is it right, all things considered, 
to extend equally to all parents the option of misusing their parental authority, or is 
that a kind of “levelling down” that unjustifiably imposes a wrong on all children, 
rather than just on some of them, in the name of fairness?
I don’t have space here to discuss such matters. (See Clayton et al (2018) for a 
philosophically informed but realistic proposal for a regulatory framework for reli-
gious schooling in England.) But one general point is too important to pass by. When 
I claim, for example, that parents have no right to send their children to a directive 
religious school, I mean specifically that the state would not be wronging parents if 
it prevented them from doing so: a policy banning all such schools would not violate 
parents’ rights. I do not mean that, where such schools are in fact permitted, a parent 
would never be justified in sending her child to such a school: the options she faces 
may be such that she not only has the right to choose such a school but even that 
she has the duty to do so (Swift 2003). Schools vary in many different ways, and con-
Journal of Practical Ethics
 ADAM SWIFT62
scientious parents will take into account the full range of their obligations to their 
children. Sometimes parents might choose a religious school not for its religion but 
for its other properties.
Suppose, for example, that, of the options available to her, only a religious school 
is “good enough”—all the available non-religious schools are inadequate, in the sense 
that, in one way or another, parents who chose such a school would be failing to 
discharge their fiduciary duties to their children. Perhaps the other schools are dan-
gerous, or rife with religious harassment, or perhaps the educational standards are so 
low that, given her other circumstances, the child does not have a realistic prospect 
of achieving self-respect or avoiding a life of poverty. (See Merry (2018) for the claim 
that Islamic schools’ ability to protect their students from stigmatic harms justifies 
parents’ choosing such schools despite the risk of indoctrinatory harms.) Perhaps, 
indeed, the alternative schools are less likely to facilitate children’s autonomy than 
the religious option. After all, nothing in my argument has ruled out the possibility 
that even a directive religious school may be more conducive to the development of 
children’s autonomy than the available non-religious alternatives. That will depend, 
in part, on the content of the religious views to which the child is being directed and 
the continuity, if any, between those views and the parents’ own.
Many parents believe that they have a right to choose the best available school 
for their children; some think that they have a duty to do so. If an option is legally 
available, they are justified in taking it. That is not my claim. Nor, in my view, is their 
choice justified simply because they believe it is the only one that is “good enough”. 
Many parents have implausible moral views about what counts as “good enough” and 
many have false beliefs about what the schools available to them are actually like. My 
point is simply that we should distinguish the question of whether the state would 
wrong parents if religious schools were banned, which is what I have been discussing 
here, from that of whether and when parents may be justified in using such a school 
where it is available. That is by no means to condone all those parents—whether reli-
gious or otherwise—who choose a religious school because they think it better than 
the alternatives.
CONCLUSION
By getting clear on what parents are for, and why exactly it is so valuable for 
many people that they get to be one, we put ourselves in a position to think coherent-
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ly about the proper scope of parents’ rights. If the familial relationship goods account 
presented here is correct, then there are many ways in which our current practice is 
too deferential to parents. Allowing them to raise their children as adherents of their 
their own religion is one such way. Where that is done at the expense of children’s 
developing the various capacities needed to make and live by their own judgments 
on religious matters, the wrong we thereby permit to inflict on their children is grave 
indeed. But even where autonomy is not impeded, parents nonetheless exceed the 
proper limits of their authority if they use their power over their children deliber-
ately to guide their children in their preferred direction. Children’s interest in a par-
ticular kind of relationship with their parents means that we must leave plenty of 
room for interactions by which parents will, in fact, tend to influence their children’s 
views about religious matters. The relationship itself, and the discretion it affords to 
parents, pose a standing threat to children’s developing the requisite independence. 
By following the misguided view that policy must respect parents’ preferences for 
their children’s schooling, and so allowing schools to reinforce the religious messages 
they get from home, we are depriving those children of their key protection against 
that threat.
But it is not only their children who suffer from excessive deference to parents. 
As I suggested at the beginning, that deference also obstructs the legitimate pursuit 
of civic goals. My argument has focused entirely on parents’ rights over, and duties 
to, their own children, but many similar policy conclusions would follow simply from 
giving proper weight to the interests of their fellow citizens. We all have a legitimate 
interest in how other people’s children are raised; that interest extends beyond the 
concern that they be trustworthy, capable of trusting others, and able to limit their 
pursuit of self-interest for the sake of mutually beneficial cooperation. It matters also 
that they are equipped to play their role as democratic citizens in a liberal state, which 
requires a range of deliberative and moral capacities that are best developed through 
contact with, and understanding of, others raised in different religious traditions, 
and none. Schools are the obvious place for that contact and understanding to be 
accomplished.
One might reject my restrictive view of parents’ rights, and grant parents more 
extensive authority over their children’s religious education, while recognising that 
parents, qua citizens, also have civic duties that properly inform policy with respect 
to religious schooling. As far as that issue is concerned, my main aim has been to 
propose a different way of thinking about the relation between parenthood and citi-
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zenship. Just as my approach offers an unusually integrated account of parents’ and 
children’s rights, so too it reduces the conflict between people’s roles as parents and 
citizens. Rather than balancing parents’ right to send their children to a religious 
school against the legitimate pursuit of civic goals, we should deny that they have 
that right in the first place.
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